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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2009, two issues have received intense attention in the
media; the first issue being the candidacy and election of the first
Black president of the United States, and the other being the global
economic meltdown. The election of Barack Obama catapulted an
important, albeit diluted, conversation on race relations in this country
as it specifically relates to the progress of human rights and Black
people. Discussions surrounding the financial crises focused on the
practices on Wall Street and the dire consequences of predatory
practices in the finance industry. These two concepts, race relations
and predatory capitalism, rarely converge in debate or conversation;
yet, the two have a relationship that extends back before the founding
of the United States.
Racial animus is rarely examined in the context of contract
formation even though the buying and selling of Black people as
slaves is at the cornerstone of this country's economic foundation and
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growth.1 With the exception of a few rare instances that will be
discussed further below, this article asserts that America's history is
devoid of any government acknowledgement of racism in predatory
commercial transactions. The enactment of the Peonage Act of 18672
and the United States Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in the
Peonage Cases provide examples of when the government considered,
and quickly dismissed racism in contract formation and enforcement.
This article asserts that the federal government has previously
facilitated and ignored racist economic predatory practices, and in
doing so, has made Black communities vulnerable to predatory
practices in commercial transactions like payday lending. Although,
the United States has signed and ratified the International Convention
for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(hereinafter, "CERD" or "Convention"), it has failed to meets its
obligations under the Convention. 3 Congress should take the next
step in addressing this problem by incorporating the broad definition
of "racial discrimination" that is included in Article 1 of CERD into
domestic laws. 4 Specifically, Congress should enact legislation that
protects Black communities from payday lending practices, which as
will be discussed, have a disproportionate negative economic impact
5
on Black communities as compared to White communities.
Part II of this paper discusses the concept of
"unconscionability" in contract law as a framework for understanding
the unequal bargaining power that Blacks have in predatory payday
lending transactions as a result of racism. Part III explores the
1

See generally VOLUME 1 or 2 JOE WILLIAM

AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

TROTTER, JR., THE AFRICAN

56-79 (1st ed. 2001) (explaining the role of the slave trade
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2Peonage

Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867).

3 United Nations, Treaty Collections, International Convention for the Elimination
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relationship between racism and capitalism in this country with
specific references to peonage contracts and crop-lien agreements.
The purpose of Part III is to show how the formal institution of racism
and historical lack of governmental protections have made Black
communities more susceptible to predatory commercial practices.
The history of and relationship between capitalism and racism is
important because, as will be explained, the purpose of CERD is to
correct the disadvantages and vulnerabilities created by institutional
racism. The paper continues in Part IV by examining a study of
payday lending institutions that demonstrates that such businesses
have a disproportionate negative economic impact on Black
communities. Part V explains the purpose of CERD, its definition of
"racial discrimination," and the United States' obligations under the
Convention to prohibit the impairment of economic development in
Black communities. Finally, Part VI proposes that Congress begin
meeting its obligations under CERD by enacting legislation that
regulates payday lending in Black communities.
II.

THE TRANSACTIONAL CAPACITY APPROACH TO THE
UNCONSCIONABILITY DEFENSE IS A FRAMEWORK
FOR UNDERSTANDING WHY RACISM HAS MADE
BLACK COMMUNITIES VULNERABLE TO
PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING.

A predatory lender can be defined as a lender who obtains
profit by engaging in unfair, but legal, transactions. 6 Typically,
predatory lenders engage a specific consumer population because of
its inexperience and lack of information and because of the lenders'
ability to manipulate the target into acquiring unaffordable products
or services.7 In other words, lenders target certain populations
6

Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87

Minn. L. Rev. 21 (Nov. 2002), availableat 87 Minn. L.Rev.1, *5 (LEXIS).
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because that they believe these groups are less likely to exert their
power in contract negotiations. We see the concept behind this
predatory lending dynamic in law professor Melvin Eisenberg's
argument for the expansion of the application of the unconscionability
defense.8
In his article, The Bargain PrincipleandIts Limits, Eisenberg
defines "bargain" as "an exchange in which each party views the
performance that he undertakes as the price of the performance
undertaken by the other." 9 He defines "bargain principle" as "the
common law rule that, in the absence of a traditional defense relating
to the quality of consent, . . courts will enforce a bargain according
to its terms."10 The theory of unconscionability is found in common
law and also articulated in the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter,
"UCC").ll It allows courts to deviate from the bargain principle and
refuse to enforce a contract that is unconscionable as a matter of
law.12
Eisenberg asserts that the theory of unconscionability is a
necessary limitation on the bargain principle because contracts are
sometimes formed in the marketplace under circumstances not
contemplated by the bargain principle. 13 He posits that the
enforcement of contracts formed under these circumstances would be
Furthermore, Eisenberg rejects the court's traditional
unfair. 14
approach to applying the unconscionability defense characterizing
such approach as rigid and failing to account for the true limits of the
bargain principle. 15 In that regard, Eisenberg advocates for an
analytical framework for the application of the unconscionability
day lending and other services, but focusing on predatory lending in the context of
home equity lending).
8 Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand Its Limits, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
741, 754 (1982).
9Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 741.
10Id.
" Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (2011); U.C.C 2-302(1) (2009).
12 U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
13See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 753-54 (describing cases where the courts used
the unconscionability defense to modify terms of a contract as anomalies under the
bargain principle).
14 Id.
5id.
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defense that focuses on the quality of the parties' bargain and the
fairness and efficiency that would be lost if the court enforced an
unfair contract under the bargain principle.16
While Eisenberg describes four situations that he asserts are
paradigms for the application of the unconscionability defense, 17 one
of those models, namely the transactional capacity model, is relevant
to a discussion of predatory lending practices in Black communities.
Transactional incapacity is the idea that a seller enters a contract with
an individual when the seller knows that the contract involves highly
complex subject matter and that the individual lacks the requisite
aptitude and experience to make a deliberative, well-informed
decision. 18 The seller uses this information about the potential buyer
to induce him to make a bargain, knowing that similar tactics would
not work on an informed consumer who has more experience with
that type of transaction. 19 The term "bargaining power" is used in this
article to describe the ability of one party to exert her will on the other
when negotiating the terms of her performance. Eisenberg asserts that
under circumstances where a party enters into negotiations with a
party that has transactional incapacity; the use of the bargain principle
20
to enforce such contracts would yield unfair results.
To illustrate his point, Eisenberg highlights the facts from
Williams v. Walker-Thomas2 1 to show how the transactional capacity
paradigm could be used in the application of the unconscionability
defense. In Williams, the named plaintiff in the class action suit, Ora
Lee Williams, defaulted on a payment in a "lease-to-own" installment
contract that she entered into with the defendant, Walker-Thomas
furniture store.22 The defendant's standard contract provided that all
installment payments would be rolled into one so that a balance
remained on all items purchased from the store until the customer
16 id.
17 See Eisenberg,

" Id. at 763.

supranote 9, at 754-785.

19 Id.
20

see id
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Id at 447. A lease-to-own contract is one in which the store retains title of the

21 Williams
22

item until the purchaser makes all of the monthly installment payments for the value
of the item plus the interest. Id.
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paid the entire balance on the current lease.23 In other words, if the
customer defaulted on a payment for any item purchased, then the
store had the right to repossess all of the items previously
purchased.24 This would occur even if the customer paid in full for
some of the previously leased items.25 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit Court") remanded
the case to the lower court holding that the court erred in rejecting the
plaintiffs' defense of unconscionability.26 Judge J. Skelly Wright
delivered the opinion of the court stating that:
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to
include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party ....In
many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is
negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.27
Ora Lee Williams was a Black woman, a fact that the D.C.
Circuit Court did not include in its discussion of the installment
contract. 28 According to one scholar, Judge Wright later stated in an
interview about the Williams case that the stereotypical features of the
plaintiff class were among his considerations when weighing the
29
In the Williams opinion, Judge Wright
fairness of the provision.
wrote that "when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little
real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or
no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even
an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the

23

id.

id.
25 id.
2
6Id.at 450.
24

27
28 Id.at

449.
Muriel Morisey Spence, Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 89, 90 (Oct. 1993) (explaining that the case
implicates stereotypes about African-American women as fiscally irresponsible
welfare
recipients).
29
id.
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terms., 30 He went on to state that "[i]n such a case the usual rule that
the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be
abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the
'1
contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.'
Eisenberg argues that most courts analyzing the Williams
contracts would not deem them unconscionable as a matter of law;
unless, the evidence demonstrated that the defendant in Williams
32
placed the terms in an inconspicuous place in the contracts.
Eisenberg rejects this approach and posits that such terms, regardless
of their placement in the contract, should be unenforceable when
buyers lack the transactional capacity to understand them.3 3
Eisenberg makes a poignant analysis of the Williams case using his
transactional incapacity theory. However, this article asserts that
because Eisenberg fails to account for the racial and social dynamics
at play in Williams, he misses a valid aspect of the bargaining
relationship between plaintiffs and defendant in that case.
As will be explained in Part III, Black communities have
experience with installment contracts3 4 and other commercial
contracts with exploitive terms; therefore, these communities do not
have transactional incapacity as contemplated by Eisenberg.
However, because these communities lack experience exerting their
bargaining power in certain commercial contract negations, they lack
transactional experience. Accordingly, the principles underlying the
unconscionability defense would still apply under Eisenberg's
transactional incapacity framework.
When the history and
relationship between racism and capitalism in America is examined in
the context of commercial transactions using Eisenberg's
30 Williams, 350 F.2d at 450.
3l1id

32

Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 773.

33 Id.

Martha Olney, Professor of Economics, examined racial borrowing patterns in a
1918-1919 Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Purchases Survey ("BLS"), and
found that merchants utilized installment payments systems with Blacks while
allowing Whites to purchase items on credit. Martha L. Olney, When Your Word Is
Not Enough: Race, Collateral,and Household Credit, 28 J. Eco. HIST. 408, 408-10
(1968).
34
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transactional incapacity model as a lens, then we can see how racism
has systematically weakened and hindered the ability of Black
communities to exert their bargaining power in commercial
transactions. Payday lending contracts provide an illustration of this
theory. As will be explored later, these contracts have the
disproportionate effect of extracting wealth from Black communities.
III.

A.

RACISM IS ENTRENCHED IN THE HISTORY OF
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING BLACK
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

Chattel Slavery

The passage of laws that condemned Africans and their
descendants to life-long servitude 35 marked the beginning of a
complex relationship between White business owners, the
government, and Black communities. The buying and selling of
slaves constituted a commercial transaction in which White
businessmen bartered for enslaved Africans. 36 Seeing the economic
profits and prosperity extracted from forced African labor, the
government made chattel slavery a more efficient and effective
business model by subjugating Blacks to a life of servitude.37 The
government thus facilitated a formidable and perpetual system of
Black exploitation in the commercial market.
The Dred Scott case further supported this model when the
Supreme Court decided that the U.S. Constitution afforded no rights
or privileges to persons of African descent because they were not
"people" or "citizens" of the United States; 38 but rather "a subordinate
and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the

See generally JOE WILLIAM TROTTER,
78 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 2001).
35

THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

36 HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 25

2010).
37 See generally id.
at 30.
38 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393,405 (1856).

76-

(Deluxe ed.
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dominant race ... ,,39 Furthermore, Chief Justice Taney depicted the
relationship between racism and capitalism by stating:
[t]he negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to
slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and
treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and
traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This
opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the
civilized portion of the white race. n°
The Court's decision in Dred Scott stripped Black people of
their right to petition U.S. courts to address any of their grievances
including those of a commercial nature. In analyzing the DreadScott
opinion, we see how the federal government created a class of people
that merchants could easily target for predatory commercial practices.
A person who has no enforceable rights in court must also lack equal
bargaining power in contract negotiations. This article asserts that the
Dred Scott decision had both legal and economic impacts that
affected Black people in the Reconstruction era and beyond.
B.

Debt Peonage

By the end of the Civil War, Black people were emancipated,
but they were far from free.4 1 In the postbellum South, the economic
structure remained virtually unchanged as White planters continued to
exploit Black people as a cheap labor source.42 Some Blacks
procured from emancipation an opportunity to improve their
economic status by purchasing small plots of land.43 Others found
themselves with new financial obligations and no work. 44 This
39

Id. at 404-05.
41 See id. at 404-05.
41

See generally

CARTER WILSON, RACISM: FROM SLAVERY TO ADVANCED

CAPITALISM 79 (Sage Publications, 1996).
42

See generally id. at 84.

43 Id.
44 CYNTHIA M. DuNcAN, WORLDS APART: WHY POVERTY PERSISTS IN RURAL

AMERICA 90 (Yale Univ. 1999).
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combination of circumstances fashioned the perfect temperament for
new expressions of old racist predatory practices.
1.

The Role of the Judiciary in the Enforcement of
Peonage Contracts

State governments enacted Black Codes that facilitated this
evolved system of slavery by making vagrancy and similar acts
illegal.45 Under these Codes, judges subjugated Blacks by punishing
them with unaffordable fines, inflated court costs, and hard labor on
the chain gang. 46 At sentencing hearings, White planters offered to
pay fines on behalf of Black Code violators in exchange for labor to
extinguish the debt.47 Many judges supervised and approved the
contracts entered into between the Code violator and the Planter; and
if a Code violator failed to adhere to the terms of the "deal," the court
sentenced him to a longer period of hard labor on the chain gang.48 In
theory these contracts, called convict-leases, applied to everyone, but
in practice, courts arranged them mostly for Black people.49
While states, not the federal government, enacted Black Codes
and created and enforced convict-leases, the federal government
actively supported these racist policies.50
Officers from the
Freedman's
Bureau
considered
convict-leases
"wholesome
compulsion" for freedmen who they believed lacked the work ethic
and mental capacity to enter into free-market, fair labor agreements. 1
In a litany of cases known as the Peonage Cases, an opportunity to
condemn convict-leases as slavery in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principaland Prejudice: The Supreme Court andRace in
the ProgressiveEra. Part2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646, 648-49
(1982).
46 id
47
1d. at 650.
48
Id at 651,699.
45

49 id
5

d at 654.
51 Schmidt, supranote 46, at 650.
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Amendment presented itself to the Supreme Court.52 But the Court
forfeited this opportunity to directly address the racial animus of these
economic transactions and the courts' role in enforcing these
agreements.53 Instead, the Court condemned the state's action in
enforcing such agreements as an inhibition on man's freedom to
create and breach contracts.54
Congress enacted the Peonage Act because convict-leases
violated the Thirteenth Amendment. 55 Nevertheless, courts in a series
of cases known as the Peonage Cases often allowed White planters to
escape liability under the Act. The Supreme Court in Clyatt v. United
States defined "peonage" as "a status or condition of compulsory
service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master., 56 It
further explained that the condition existed even absent enforcement
by law so long as two parties contracted for the exchange of labor for
money and the debtor could not elect to release himself from the
contract. 57 Despite this broad definition of peonage, the Court in
Clyatt reversed the trial court's conviction of a defendant under the
Act, even though the defendant traveled to Florida to forcibly return
two Black men to Georgia to work off a debt that they owed to him. 58
Because the state charged the defendant with "returning" one to
peonage, it had to provide explicit testimony demonstrating that the
two Black men had previously existed in the condition and that the
59
defendant specifically returned them to that circumstance.
52

See generally Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 227 (1911); United States v.

Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 138 (1914).
51 See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 231 (Justice Hughes stating, "We at once dismiss from
consideration the fact that the plaintiff in error is a black man. While the action of a
state, through its officers charged with the administration of a law fair in
appearance, may be of such a character as to constitute a denial of equal protection
of the laws, such a conclusion is here neither required nor justified. The statute, on
its face, makes no racial discrimination, and the record fails to show its existence in

fact.").
54 id.
55 Peonage Act,
56

supranote 3.

Clyatt v. United States 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905).

" Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215 (quoting Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N. M. 190, 194 (N.M.
Terr. 1857)).
sId.at 222.
59 Id.
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According to the Court, the state failed to make a sufficient showing
of this fact and thus it overturned the defendant's conviction. 60 The
Court's rigid interpretation of the statute and feigned ignorance to the
reality of peonage agreements only further perpetuated the racism
underlying these contracts.
After the decision in Clyatt, the Supreme Court had another
opportunity to address the racial animus of peonage contracts, but
again chose not to do so. In Bailey v. Alabama, the Court struck
down an Alabama code as unconstitutional where the code punished
persons who executed contracts with intent to defraud their employer
because the statute presumed intent to defraud anytime someone
failed to perform or repay payment advancements without just
cause.

61

The state charged the defendant Bailey under the Alabama
code because he breached a contract with Riverside Company. 62 The
contract required Bailey to work for the company for a year in
exchange for a cash advance. 63 Even though the record indicated that
Bailey was a Black man, the Court dismissed racism as a rationale for
the statute and failed to address its unequal application to Black
people.64
The Court declared the Alabama statute unconstitutional on
the grounds that without actual evidence of intent to defraud,
conviction for breach of a contract amounted to a conviction for
failure to pay a debt, which violated the Thirteenth Amendment and
the Peonage Act.65 The Court went on to minimize further the racial
implications of the Alabama statute by stating "while the immediate
concern [of the Thirteenth Amendment] was African slavery, the
Amendment was not limited to that. It was a charter of universal civil
freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color, or estate, under the
flag., 66 Also, the Court's refusal to address the statute as a violation
6 id.
61
62

See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 219.
Id. at 229-30.

63id.

64Id. at 231-32.
65 Id.
at 239,

242.

66 Id. at 240-41.
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of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, further
de-emphasized the disproportionate amount of peonage contracts
between Black farmers and White planters.67 This article contends
that the Court's failure to address the racism in these cases is
important because it allowed Congress and the Judiciary to continue
to overlook the unchecked racial violence and retaliation that existed
in interracial commercial transactions in the South.
When racists White farmers stopped relying on the police and
the state to enforce their peonage contracts and when they faced
criminal charges for returning Blacks to peonage, these farmers
unleashed an unprecedented reign of violence and terror on Black
Although, the U.S. Attorney's office pursued
communities. 68
convictions for White planters who violated the Peonage Act,69 but
acts of violence committed by racists Whites against Blacks went
relatively unpunished. 70 Historian Eric Foner describes a violent
response from the Ku Klux Klan (hereinafter, "Klan") toward Black
sharecroppers and farm laborers who questioned exploitive
contracts. 7 1 For example, he notes that the Klan beat a Black man for
suing his debtor in court, because "darkeys were through with suing
white men." 72 They whipped another Black man for challenging a
planter that cheated him out of his crop share. 73 Basically, the Klan
decided to "compel [Blacks] to do by fear what they were unable to
make them do by law."74 This reinforcement made continued
economic exploitation of Blacks easier in Reconstruction and made

67

68

See Schmidt, supranote 46.
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION

AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION

1863-1877,

425 (Henry Steel Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., Harper & Row) (1988).
69 Schmidt, supra note 42, at 671 (explaining the findings of Attorney General
Charles W. Russell, special investigator and prosecutor to coordinate federal action
against
peonage).
70
FONER, supranote 69, at 428-29.
71 Id. at 428.
72 Id. at 429 (internal quotations omitted).
73

74

Id

See id. (quoting a Democratic judge from Alabama and explaining that the Klan
sought to take over the "labor control function" that the state government used to
serve but that Congress forced it to abandon during Reconstruction) (internal
quotations omitted).
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bargaining in these commercial transactions dangerous for Black
people.75
We can say that as the Supreme Court did not discuss the
racism underlying convict leases in the Peonage Cases, the federal
government could assert that the passage of the Peonage Act and the
prosecution of some of its violators sufficiently addressed the
exploitive economic practices of slavery in the postbellum South.
2.

Crop-Lien Agreements

Through sharecropping, White planters maintained a system
of economic hierarchy that reflected the racist undertones of slavery.76
Planters did not limit the sharecropping structure to the formerly
enslaved, but Blacks constituted a disproportionate majority of the
sharecropper class. 77 Only 13% of Blacks claimed ownership to the
land they plowed and sowed in contrast to the 42.4% of White farm
laborers who owned the land they worked.78 Also, a hierarchy existed
within the sharecropping world that reflected an uneven racial
distribution of White farmers making up the majority in the more
equitable landlord-tenant arrangements and Blacks mostly occupying
the poorest class of peons. 79 Recently emancipated Blacks owned
very little, and thus many of them worked as sharecroppers providing
labor in exchange for a percentage of their harvested crops.80
After the Civil War, a shortage in capital created a huge
market for a credit system where farmers received supply advances
from merchants in exchange for a percentage of their crops. 1 Once
sold, the crops would yield enough cash to cover the price of the
supplies and the interest charged on the advance.8 2 Some White
planters opened merchant stores on their plantations after they
75 See generally FONER, supranote 69.
76 WILSON, supranote 42, at 82.
77Id. at 85.
78 id.
79 id.
80

Id.

81FONER, supra note 69, at 394.
82

Id.
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realized that many Black sharecroppers used their crop shares as
collateral to repay merchants for farming supplies advanced to them
at high interest rates. 83 Therefore, being a landlord and a merchant
could allow planters to "double-dip" so to speak by allowing them to
receive a larger percentage of the sharecropper's harvest. Both
independent merchants and planter merchants, loaned supplies to
Black sharecroppers on household credit lines and required repayment
at an average interest rate of 71%.84 This rate often represented three
times the amount of interest that White planters paid on their credit
lines.8 5 Thus, the rate of return that sharecroppers received at harvest
time paled in comparison to the cost of purchasing supplies. Foner
quotes one Black resident of Mississippi as saying the "crops ha[d]
been mortgaged for supplies before they ha[d] been planted. 86
Independent merchants often required sharecroppers to obtain
a guarantor or the co-signature of the sharecropper's landowneremployer as a condition of granting the loan.87 Whites measured
creditworthiness not only by a Black sharecropper's ability to repay,
but also by the level of deference he or she showed to the planter.88
More disturbingly, the Klan used violence against Blacks that defied
White planters and against merchants who treated Blacks fairly in
commercial transactions. 89 Furthermore, as desired by the Klan,90 an
inability to repay the planter or vendor had far reaching consequences
on the economic prosperity and mobility of Black sharecroppers
because their creditworthiness often dictated their mobility and ability
to seek employment with other planters. 91

3Id.
at

406.

84 JAY R. MANDLE, NOT SLAVE, NOT FREE: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN ECONOMIC
EXPERIENCE SINCE THE CiviL WAR 42 (Duke University Press 1992).
85
8

Id.

87

MANDLE,

6 FONER,supranote 69, at 408.

supra note 85.

88 Id.
89

FONER,

supra note 69, at 429, 431(explaining that the Klan killed a Jewish

merchant known for his fair dealings with Black customers, along with many Black
people during a massacre in Jackson, Florida).
90 Id.
91 MANDLE,

supranote 85.
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From this recitation of history, we can see that the Peonage
Act and subsequent Peonage Cases along with the rise of Klan
violence show that although Planters could not legally enforce convict
leases, they had other means to enforce contracts for the exploitation
of Black labor. Therefore, using the definition of unconscionable as
set forth in the Williams case, we can say that these crop lien contracts
were unconscionable because Black communities did not have a
meaningful choice in the negotiation of such contracts and because
the terms of such contracts unreasonably favored White planters and
merchants. This article posits that this environment left Black
communities with the experience of having little to no bargaining
power when negotiating commercial contracts. As a result, Black
communities ended up in exploitive contracts in disproportionate
numbers. This analysis serves as the basis for this article's assertion
that Black communities have a transactional incapacity in commercial
contract negotiations that makes them vulnerable to predatory payday
lending practices. As will be explained in the proceeding section, the
business operations of payday lenders show how business entities take
advantage of this transactional incapacity in Black communities
today.
IV.

PAYDAY LENDING

A payday loan is as a relatively small loan given to a
consumer over an average period of 14 days in exchange for a
postdated check.92 The postdated check serves as collateral for the
loan and is returned by the lender upon satisfaction of the debt.93
Lenders make these loans at an average annual percentage interest
rate of 390% or approximately fifteen to twenty dollars for every

92

Gregory Elliehausen, Ph.D. & Edward C Lawrence, Ph. D., PayDay Advance

Credit in America: An Analysis of Customer Demand (2001), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/j an/CFRSS_2005_ellehausen.pdf (last
visited Aug. 29, 2011).
93
Id. at 1.
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$100 borrowed.94 However, in some instances payday lenders charge
an annual percentage rate of up to 910%. 95
An example of a payday-lending contract is illustrative of how
the transaction works. In Johnson v. Cash Store, the plaintiff, a fastfood restaurant manager, needed money to pay her bills after paying
an unexpected medical bill for the family pet.96 The plaintiff went to
a payday lender for a small cash advance of $250. 97 The clerk at the
payday lender advised the plaintiff that she should apply for a loan of
$500 in order to receive a better interest rate. 98 The woman agreed
and gave the lender a postdated check for $575 to cover the cost of
the loan and the interest fee. 99 The plaintiff walked away from the
transaction with the understanding that the lender would return the
postdated check when she returned to the lender in two weeks with
$575 in cash.'
The date for payment arrived, and the plaintiff could not
afford to pay the full amount of the loan. 1 1 The clerk at the payday
lender told the plaintiff to bring $575 in cash to the lender so that she
could "rollover" her loan.' 0 2 To rollover her loan, the woman had to
sign a new agreement promising to pay the entire $575 two weeks

94

Id. at 3.
95 Johnson, supra note 7, at *2(discussing the court's calculation of the interest fee
charged to the payday borrower plaintiff in Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price,
102 F.Supp.2d 1375, 1379n.3 (S.D. Ga. 2003)); Wei Li et. al, Predatory Profiling:
The Role of Race and Ethnicity in the Locations of PayDay Lenders in California,
available
at
2
(2009)
Lending
for
Responsible
Center
http://www.responsiblelending.org/califomia/ca-payday/researchanalysis/predatory-profiling.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2011) (noting that the average
interest rate charged for payday loan is up to 490%); CONSUMER FED. OF AM., RENTA-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: HOW BANKS HELP PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE
available
at
(2001),
4
PROTECTIONS
CONSUMER

http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/paydayreport.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2011)
(surveying payday lenders and finding that they charge borrowers, on average, an
annual
percentage rate between 18.2% and 910%).
96
Johnson v. Cash Store, 68 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
97 id.

98 Id.
99 Id.
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101 Id.

'0' Johnson, 68 P.3d at 1102.
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from the date of the new agreement. 10 3 After signing the new
agreement, the plaintiff gave the clerk the full $575 in cash, of which
the clerk kept $75 and returned the remainder. 10 4 This ping-pong of
money and loan agreements between the plaintiff and the defendant
continued for 14 more rollover transactions where each time the
lender kept an amount reflecting the finance charge for each loan and
gave the woman $500.1°5 Seven months from the date of the original
payday loan of $500, the plaintiff found that she had paid more than
$1,100 in interest fees on her loan but still maintained a debt for the
principal balance of $500.106 After the plaintiff stopped payment on a
postdated check held by the defendant, the defendant threatened the
plaintiff by saying that she would go to prison if she failed to repay
the loan. 0 7 Ultimately, the plaintiff paid the defendant which resulted
in a foreclosure on her trailer and an incurred debt of $20,000 on her
10 8
foreclosed home.
The Center for Responsible Lending (hereinafter, "CRL")
09
conducted a recent study of payday lending in California.1
According to the study, payday lenders target Black and Latino
communities by maintaining more storefronts in neighborhoods with
a high concentration of African-Americans and Latinos."O
Researchers conducted the study by performing a regression model
that controlled for other variables that could explain the concentration
and location of payday lending in Black and Latino communities.111
The researchers also used group-block data collected in the U.S.
Census in 2000 to determine the concentration of Black and Latinos
in different California neighborhoods. 12 Even when controlling for
income levels, the study revealed that payday lenders are eight times
more concentrated in neighborhoods in California that have the
103 id.

104 id.
105
106 Id.
id.
107

Id. at 1103.

108 Id.

109 Wei Li et al., supra note 96.
10
1Id. at 10.
.ll
112 Id. at 6-9, 14.
Id. at8.
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highest concentration of Black and Latino people.1 13 Even though
Black and Latino residents of California only make-up one third of
the state's population, these communities represent more than 55% of
payday loan borrowers in the state. 114 This disproportionate location
of payday lenders and the disproportionate numbers of Black and
Latino borrowers resulted in the payment of approximately $246
million dollars in loan fees in one year by residents of
overwhelmingly Black and Latino neighborhoods." 5
The CRL's California study is not the only one to report that
payday lenders target Black and Latino neighborhoods. Reports
conducted analyzing payday lending data from Illinois 1 6 and from
North Carolina"17 also conclude that such lenders are more likely to
be located in minority neighborhoods.
Payday lending models are most profitable if consumers
become trapped in debt cycles. 118 Payday lenders receive 90% of
their revenue from borrowers who average five or more loans per year
and 60% of their revenue from borrowers with twelve or more loans
per year. 1 9 Payday lenders do not allow borrowers to make partial
payments on their loans. 12° Because payment of the first loan tends to
leave borrowers with insufficient funds to cover their expenses until
12 1
their next paycheck, they often obtain a subsequent payday loan.
The CRL study asserts that in California most payday borrowers
receive, on average, ten payday loans per year. 122 In some instances,

..Id at 10.

14Id at 12.
115 Wei Li et al., supranote 96, at 12.
116 CONSUMER FED. OF AM., supra note 96, at 8 (citing the Woodstock Institute report

analyzing pay day loan data collected by the Illinois Department of Financial
Institutions in 1999).
117 We Li et al., supra note 96, at 6 (citing a 2005 report sponsored by the Center for
Responsible Lending, which found that payday lenders are three times more likely
to be located in Black neighborhoods in North Carolina.).
118
See Johnson, supra note 4, at *55-56; CONSUMER FED. OF AM., supranote 96, at 6
(stating that "It]he design of these loans leads to frequent roll-overs and perpetual
debt").
119 We Li et al., supranote 96, at 2.
120
Johnson, supranote 7, at *3-4.
121We Li et al., supranote 96, at 24.
122 id.
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payday lenders make loans more appealing by emphasizing only
certain information concerning the cost of the loan. 123 For instance,
lenders will advertise only the flat dollar amount charged per $100
borrowed by the consumer without explaining that an annual
percentage interest rate is applied to the loan or that the interest
124
compounds when a loan is repaid with another payday loan.
Research shows that repeat payday borrowers, and most payday
borrowers are repeat customers, suffer negative long-term financial
problems as a result of their payday loans. 125 In some instances,
lenders sue borrowers who default on their loans under civil bounced
check laws that allow such lenders to recover treble damages. 126 At
the very least, we can say that the interest fees and rollover fees paid
to payday lenders over time are monies that borrowers could place in
their savings accounts.
This debt trap of rollover fees and interest payments bears a
striking resemblance to those practices used to keep Black
sharecroppers in a form of debt peonage. Like crop-liens during
Reconstruction, payday loans are used with Black communities in
disproportionate numbers and such agreements also create a cycle of
indebtedness for borrowers. While payday loans are not reinforced
with threats of violence, they are accompanied by threats of civil law
suit and in some instances criminal charges. 127 Lenders armed with
this information know that it is unlikely for a person to default on a
payday loan despite the financial consequences of rolling over the
1 28
loan and paying more fees.
As discussed in a previous section, racism and capitalism have
created conditions where Blacks have unequal bargaining power and
123

See id. at 23 (explaining that payday lenders typically advertise the flat amount

charged per $100 dollars borrowed but that survey of borrowers show that they
either were not aware of the annual percentage rate charged on the loan or they
understated
the actual interest rate charged.).
124
id.

125 Id. at 5 (analyzing payday consumer survey data and payday industry records.).
126 Johnson, supra note 7, at *26; CONSUMER FED. OF AM., supra note 96, at 8.
127CONSUMER FED. OF AM., supra note 89, at 8 (stating that lenders sometimes

threaten to use criminal bad check writing laws against defaulting borrowers.).
128 Id. (explaining that payday lenders target vulnerable consumers and that the
payday loan model incentivizes lenders to encourage borrowers to roll over loans).
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are an easy target for predatory lenders. Therefore, as will be
explained in the next section, the federal government has an
obligation under CERD to enact legislation that protects Black
communities from unfair payday lending terms.
V.

THE U.S. RATIFIED CERD, AND THUS IT HAS AN
OBLIGATION TO ELMIMINATE PREDATORY
ECONOMIC PRACTICES THAT HAVE A
DISPROPORTIONATELY NEGATIVE ECONOMIC
EFFECT ON BLACK COMMUNITIES AS A RESULT OF
DISADVANTAGES CREATED BY RACISM.

Under CERD, a State's failure to regulate predatory economic
practices that disproportionately affect Black communities constitutes
a failure to "bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including
legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any
persons, group or organization.' ' 129 CERD broadly defines the term
"racial discrimination" as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic
origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
1 30
freedoms in... economic.., life.
Furthermore, a comment by the Committee on the Elimination of
provided
"Committee")
Racial Discrimination (hereinafter,
clarification on Article 1(1) stating that "[a] distinction is contrary to
the Convention if it has either the purpose or the effect of impairing
particular rights and freedoms."' 3' Therefore, we can say that
129

See generally CERD, supra note 5.

130 Id. at art. 1(1).
131

Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Gen. Rec.

1 (emphasis
added),
of Discrimination
art.
No.
14: Definition
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/d7bd5d2bf71258aacl 2563ee004b639e?
Opendocument (last visited Aug. 17, 2011).
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merchants and lenders who disproportionately use exploitive
economic practices in Black communities are engaging in racial
discrimination. This premise is further supported by the fact that the
Committee regards evidence that certain practices have a
disproportionate impact on a race as sufficient evidence of racial
discrimination.

32

Article 2(2) further provides that:
State parties shall, when circumstances so warrant,
take, in the social . . . economic, . . . special and

concrete measures to ensure the adequate development
and protection of certain racial groups or individuals
belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing
them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and
1 33
fundamental freedoms.
The Committee clarified the language inArticle 2 by asserting that
"[s]tates should be sensitive towards the rights of persons belonging
to ethnic groups, particularly their right to lead lives of dignity ...to

share equitably in the fruits of national growth and to play their part in
'1 34
the Government of the country of which they are citizens."
The language of the Convention and the governing comments
depict economic development as a positive right 135 owed to all groups
and which should be protected for racial groups that have experienced
systematic discrimination. At the time of ratification, the United
States took reservation to Article 2(d), maintaining that U.S. domestic
law provided sufficient protection from racial discrimination in the
private sector.1 36 However, the U.S. has not adopted the broad
definition of "racial discrimination" articulated in Article 1 of the
132id
133CERD,
134

supra note 34 at art. 2 (2).
Committee on Elimination, supranote 36 at No. 21.

135David Weissbrodt & Connie de la Vega, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AN INTRODUCTION 70 (Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. ed., Univ. of Penn Press) ( 2007)
(explaining that a positive right creates an obligation for the state to provide a right,
this is different from a negative right where a state should refrain from infringing on
the rights of the people).
136
United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 4.
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Convention. 137 Therefore, no domestic law exists that provides the
comprehensive level of protection required by the language of Article
2. Consequently, this article asserts that the U.S. has failed to meet its
obligations under the Convention even in the context of its reservation
to the treaty.
This article posits that under CERD, the disproportionate
negative financial impact that payday lending has on minority
communities, and payday lenders preference for servicing this group
with would be sufficient evidence to show racial discrimination under
CERD. Many payday lenders target these communities and given the
nature of the payday lending model, this decision is costly to Black
communities. In that regard, payday lenders impair the ability of
Black communities to enjoy economic life on equal footing with
Whites. The relationship between racism and capitalism in this
country demonstrates how Black communities have historically been
For these reasons,
more susceptible to exploitive contracts.
government action is needed to correct an imbalance that has left
Blacks with unequal bargaining power in commercial transactions.
The next section of this article suggests that the U.S. government
could begin to meet its obligation under CERD by incorporating the
definition of "racial discrimination" listed in Article 1 of the
Convention into legislation that regulates payday lending in general,
and Black communities in particular.
CONGRESS COULD BEGIN TO MEET ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CERD BY ENACTING
LEGISLATION THAT PROHIBITS THE USE OF
"ROLLOVER" TERMS IN PAYDAY LENDING
CONTRACTS, CAPS THE INTEREST RATES THAT MAY
BE CHARGED TO CONSUMERS, AND LIMITS THE
CONCENTRATION OF PAYDAY LENDING
ESTABLISHMENTS IN BLACK COMMUNITES.
VI.

37
' U.N.

OHCHR, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, U.S., 10, CERD/USA/CO/6 February 2008.

Human Rights & GlobalizationLaw Review

Some states have already enacted legislation placing limits on
138
the interest rates that can be charged to payday lender consumers.
Congress should enact legislation that prohibits racial discrimination
in payday lending by targeting those elements that make such
transactions exploitive. In 2005, Congressman Bobby Rush of Illinois
introduced the Payday Borrower Protection Act of 2005 (hereinafter,
the "Bill") as a bill aimed to protect consumers from "usurious
'1 39
interest rates, exorbitant fees, and perpetual debt."
The proposed law provided that payday loans would only be
lawful in those states that promulgated regulations in conformity with
the Bill. 140 The Bill would have required state agencies to prohibit a
lender from, among other things, accepting repayment of a loan which
the lender knows is being paid from the proceeds of another pay day
loan,14 ' and rolling over a payday loan unless thirty days from the
termination of a prior loan to the customer has elapsed. 142 Under the
Bill, states would have to force lenders to limit the annual interest rate
applied to the payday loan to "the lesser of 36% or the maximum
43
annual percentage rate allowed in the state for small loans."'
The Bill should be re-introduced in Congress with an
amendment that requires states to impose hefty statutory fines on
lenders who engage in racial discrimination. Under this proposed
Bill, a lender engages in "racial discrimination," within the meaning
of the Bill, if: (1) its payday lending contracts contain any prohibited
or otherwise unconscionable terms; or (2) the contracts deviated from
the requirements set forth in the Bill; and (3) over 50% of the lender's
138 See ARIz. REv. STAT. § 6-1260(F) (Supp. 2001) (LexisNexis 2011) (capping

finance fees for payday lending at 15% of the face value of the check for the initial
transaction and extensions); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-105 (2011) (limiting the
finance charge for payday loans to 20% for the first $300 and 45% annually for
each payday loan); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 560.404(6) (LexisNexis 2011) (stating that fees
charged for a deferred presentment transaction shall not exceed 10% of the payment
instrument). Payday loans are also known as deferred deposit loans. Johnson,
supra note 7, at *9.
139 Payday Borrower Protection Act, H.R. 1660, 109th Cong.
§ 4(a) (2005).
140id
141
142

Id. § 4(b)(6)(E).

id.
141 Id § 4(b)(7)(D)..
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borrowers live in neighborhoods highly populated with people from a
historically discriminated against race, ethnicity, or national origin.
This statutory fine would have to be significant enough to
deter lenders from, not only violating the statute by engaging in unfair
lending practices, but also from using such practices in communities,
like Black communities, that are more susceptible to them. As
previously discussed, studies from the Center for Responsible
Lending identify a relationship between a 55% of payday borrowers
being Black or Latino and millions of dollars in fees being paid to
lenders by these people. Based on this information, requiring the
percentage of borrowers from historically discriminated against
communities to be less than 50% is an appropriate trigger for this
proposed definition of "racial discrimination." Furthermore, the
previous version of the Bill required state agencies to force the lender
to maintain records appropriate for compliance with the Bill and to
submit annual reports containing information that the agency deems
necessary to monitor compliance. 44 These provisions should be
included in the proposed version of the Bill; lenders should be
required to track the demographics of their borrowers 145 and report
that information to state agencies.
Lenders should record a
borrower's address and provide the borrower with the option of
identifying his or her race. State agencies could then use census data
to monitor average income and overall wealth of communities where
payday lenders are concentrated, as done in the CRL's California
study. Finally, a portion of the proceeds from statutory fines imposed
on violating lenders should be used to fund financial education and
debt management programs in minority communities.
These
programs could help to keep these communities from being
146
vulnerable to exploitive payday lending contracts.

'44Id. §

4(b)(5)(B).

See Elliehausen, et al., supra note 93 (noting that few payday advance
companies collect customer demographic data on a consistent basis).
146 See We Li et al., supra note 89, at 26 (explaining that consumer education
programs and alternatives to payday lending could alleviate the use of payday
145

loans).
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VII.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. government ratified CERD. Accordingly, the U.S. is
obligated to apply its definition of racial discrimination domestically.
The language of the Convention reflects the international
community's understanding that chattel slavery and institutional
racism continue to adversely affect the populations that were once
subjected to this oppression. States that have ratified the Convention
have an obligation to do more than promise not to repeat their
mistakes. The Convention requires nations to take affirmative action
to correct the social harms caused by racism. Thus far, the United
States has failed to satisfy CERD requirements in the arena of
predatory lending practices.
When we examine the underlying principles of the theory of
unconscionability and the history of racism and capitalism, we have a
better understanding of why Black communities are less likely to
exert their bargaining power in commercial transactions and thus
more susceptible to predatory lending practices. If the government
does not deter private commercial institutions, like payday lenders,
from taking advantage of this dynamic, then Black communities will
continue to be impaired in their ability to enjoy fundamental freedom
on equal footing in economic life in the United States.

